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#kill0sum:
Towards sufficiently selective data retention

Panel 5 | The death of data retention at EU level
Conference 'Freedom AND Security. Killing the zero sum process'
ERA & Europol's Data Protection Experts Network (EDEN)
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### Relevant CJEU case law

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#### invalidating both EU & US generalised data retention practices

- 2014 Digital Rights Ireland (invalidating EU Data Retention Directive)
- 2015 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (invalidating Safe Harbour)
- 2016 Tele2 Sverige AB (data retention ePrivacy Directive)
- 2016 Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission (Privacy Shield; pending)
- Schrems III (SCC, preliminary ruling y Irish High Court; pending)
  - High Court decision October 2017: distinction mass/bulk *searching* (targeted, not indiscriminate), but involving the collection of non-relevant data, i.e. bulk *acquisition*, *collection or retention* = mass indiscriminate processing (Upstream)

#### not contradicted by

- PNR Canada Opinion (per se selective)
- Big Brother Watch and Others v UK (no reasonable suspicion required)



## CJEU data retention-collection-storage standards | 1

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- may not happen on a generalised basis
- may not be indiscriminate
- may not be bulk-collection
- must be limited to what is <u>strictly necessary</u>
- requires differentiation, limitation or exception in light of the objective pursued
- must be <u>targeted</u> (at least not fully untargeted; scope for 'relatively untargeted')
- must be limited to data pertaining to a <u>particular time period</u> and/or a <u>particular geographical zone</u> and/or to a <u>circle of particular persons</u>



## CJEU data retention-collection-storage standards | 2

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- must be <u>limited with respect to</u> (cumulatively):
  - the <u>categories of data</u> to be retained
  - the <u>means of communication</u> affected
  - the <u>retention period</u> adopted
  - the "persons concerned" or "the public that may potentially be affected"
- must be defined on the basis of <u>objective evidence</u> which makes it possible to identify a public whose data is likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal offences, and to contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to preventing a serious risk to public security
- does not need to amount to 'reasonable suspicion', the requirement of which was dismissed in Big Brother Watch and Others v UK (ECtHR, 2018)



# #kill0sum | Sufficiently selective data retention?



## #kill0sum | Mind the traps | 1

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#### relevant EU legislation

- Artt. 9 and 22 GDPR
- Att. 10-11 LED and relevant recitals (37-38)

prohibited automated processing, including profiling

 when producing adverse legal effects or significantly affecting the data subject: <u>prohibited unless authorised by EU or MS law</u> + <u>appropriate</u> <u>safeguards, including the right to human intervention</u>

discriminatory effects (direct or indirect)

counter to Artt. 21 and 52 Charter



## #kill0sum | Mind the traps | 2

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use of special ('sensitive') data categories (either or not in profiling)

- processing revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation
- allowed only where <u>strictly necessary</u>, subject to <u>appropriate safeguards</u> for the data subject, and only <u>where authorised by Union or MS law</u>
- 'appropriate safeguards': e.g. only in connection with other data on the natural person concerned, the possibility to secure the data collected adequately, stricter rules on the access of staff, and prohibition of transmission
  - ! many examples of avoiding discrimination by combining with other data



### #kill0sum | Checklist: evidence, feasible, lawful?

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#### irrespective of

- selectors/discriminants used
- type of info the retention is envisaged of (subscriber data, access data, transactional data, geo-location data, content data, ...)

#### check

- evidence base? (objective or objectifiable)
- feasibility of implementation? (technical, operational, financial, ...)
- use of sensitive data (profiling)? (requiring an explicit legal basis and appropriate, suitable safeguards)
- discriminatory effect? (direct or indirect?)



### #kill0sum | Possible selectors or discriminants

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ratione personae (characteristics of targeted persons)

• age, gender, nationality, racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, membership (of an association, trade union, ...), ...

ratione loci (residence or presence of targeted persons)

• city, street, neighbourhood, public space, square, ...

ratione itineris (targeted routes of communications or data flows, in terms of origin, transit, destination or combinations thereof)

• country/city, neighbourhood/building, server, company, hotspot, provider, ...

ratione temporis (targeted period or time frame(s))

• month/week/day/time-slot, event-based (concert, Xmas market, football match, ...), suspicious timings, ...

ratione instrumenti (targeting persons using certain means of communication)


 use(rs) of certain communication means (Signal, Telegram, ...), encryption tools, secure VPN's, ..., foreign (unregistered) sim cards (roaming), ...



# Discussion | Q&A

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